Ukraine Warzone, image by Douglas Ross
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The graves are still fresh in Ukraine, and they will deepen so long as Globalists and Moscow insist on fighting a proxy war to the last Ukrainian. Their very blood pays for every artillery strike and drone swarm that the Pontic steppe has already absorbed for three millennia. This essay argues that the contested belt—Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk—has never been the property of any single empire; it has always functioned as a buffer, a marchland whose value lies precisely in the fact that it does not belong exclusively to any power. The only durable solution is to acknowledge the past and to revive it in a modern form.
I. A Brief Archaeology of Neutrality
Scythian Horseman beguile Cyrus the Great, image by Douglas Ross.
- 550 BC – The Persian Achaemenids under Cyrus the Great establish the satrapy of Skudra on the northern shores of the Sea of Azov.
- 334 BC – Alexander’s Macedonians march past the Danube delta, leaving Greek poleis along the Crimean coast.
- 63 BC – Rome’s fleet winters at Chersonesos, turning the peninsula into a grain depot for Legions.
- 4th century AD – The Ostrogoths, fleeing Hunnic terror, settle the Crimea and rule for 200 years.
- 988 AD – Volodymyr’s Baptism unites Kyiv but *not* the Wild Fields east of the Dnipro; those remain steppe commons.
- 1237–1240 – The Mongols sweep in and turn Crimea into a vassal of the Khanate, later Tatar-ruled until 1783.
- 1783 – Catherine the Great annexes Crimea after 400 years of Tatar sovereignty.
- 1918–1922 – White Russian, Red, Ukrainian, German, French, and Polish forces all march across the Donbas.
- 1991 – The Soviet collapse hands the buffer belt to Kyiv, but the region’s memory is *multinational*, not Ukrainian or Russian alone.
Stalin Collectivizes the Pontic Steppe, image by Douglas Ross.
Key takeaway: no ruler from Darius to Stalin has ever erased the marchland character; every attempt at exclusive sovereignty has bred revolt.
II. Demographics Disputed Oblasts in the Ukraine-Russia War
The disputed regions typically refer to Donetsk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Kherson Oblast, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (often grouped with the oblasts despite its distinct status). These areas were claimed by Russia following referendums in 2014 (for Crimea) and 2022 (for the others), but the annexations are widely unrecognized internationally.
Ethnic composition data are primarily from the last complete Ukrainian census in 2001, as subsequent events, such as the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the 2022 full-scale invasion, have disrupted comprehensive censuses. The 2001 data reflects pre-war demographics and is often cited in discussions of the conflict. Russia conducted censuses in Crimea in 2014 and 2021, showing shifts toward a higher Russian percentage, possibly due to migration, assimilation, or methodological differences—Ukraine disputes these and many international observers. No reliable, independent recent ethnic estimates exist for the other oblasts due to ongoing war, displacement (millions have fled), and Russian occupation, which has led to enforced Russification in some areas.
For Donetsk Oblast, the 2001 Ukrainian census showed that 56.9% of the population identified as Ukrainian, 38.2% as Russian, and other major groups included Greeks at 1.6%, Belarusians at 0.9%, Tatars at 0.4%, Armenians at 0.3%, Jews at 0.2%, and Azerbaijanis at 0.2%. For Luhansk Oblast, the population was comprised of 58.0% Ukrainians, 39.0% Russians, with Belarusians at 0.8%, Tatars at 0.3%, and Armenians at 0.3%. In Kherson Oblast, the figures were 82.0% Ukrainians, 14.1% Russians, 0.7% Belarusians, 0.5% Tatars, 0.4% Moldavians, 0.4% Armenians, and 0.2% Crimean Tatars. Zaporizhzhia Oblast had 70.8% Ukrainians, 24.7% Russians, Bulgarians at 1.4%, Belarusians at 0.7%, Armenians at 0.3%, Tatars at 0.3%, Jews at 0.2%, and Georgians at 0.2%. For the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, based on the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 24.3% Ukrainians, 58.3% Russians, Crimean Tatars at 12.0%, Belarusians at 1.4%, Tatars at 0.5%, Armenians at 0.4%, Jews at 0.2%, Poles at 0.2%, Moldavians at 0.2%, and Azerbaijanis at 0.2%. The 2014 Russian census for Crimea (including Sevastopol) reported that 15.7% of the population were Ukrainians, 67.9% were Russians, 12.6% were Crimean Tatars, 1.0% were Belarusians, 0.5% were Armenians, 0.1% were Jews, and 6.2% were from other ethnic groups. Finally, the 2021 Russian census for Crimea (including Sevastopol) indicated that 7.7% of the population were Ukrainians, 76.4% were Russians, 12.7% were Crimean Tatars, 0.5% were Belarusians, 0.4% were Armenians, 0.1% were Jews, and 2.2% were from other ethnic groups. Percentages are rounded and include groups comprising at least 0.2% of the population.
Key Notes
- **2001 Census Context**: This was the last nationwide census before significant geopolitical changes. Ethnic self-identification was voluntary, and the data includes both urban and rural populations. Eastern oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk) had higher Russian percentages due to historical industrialization and migration under the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.
- **Post-2014 Changes in Crimea**: Russian censuses show a decline in Ukrainians and an increase in Russians, attributed by critics to emigration of non-Russians, influx of Russian settlers, and potential undercounting or coercion. Crimean Tatars, historically deported by the Soviets in 1944 and repatriated in the 1990s, remain a significant minority.
- **War Impacts**: Since 2014, millions have been displaced from these regions, altering demographics. For example, many Ukrainians fled Russian-occupied areas, while some Russians may have moved in. No neutral census has been conducted in occupied territories since 2001, and Russian data (beyond Crimea) is limited and contested.
- **Sources and Balance**: Data is substantiated from official Ukrainian census records and Wikipedia summaries (which compile census info). For controversial aspects, such as Russian censuses, note that they represent Moscow's perspective but are not recognized by Ukraine or most Western sources.
III. The Current Impasse
Russia: Putin demands NATO rollback, recognition of annexed territory, and security guarantees for Russian speakers.
Ukraine: Zelensky insists on complete territorial integrity and future EU/NATO entry.
NATO: Brussels pledges open-ended support but refuses to station troops—an open invitation to perpetual attrition.
All three narratives are mutually exclusive only if the buffer is declared the property of one side. History says it cannot be.
IV. A Balanced Solution
1. **Neutral Buffer Zone (NBZ)**: Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk would be jointly demilitarized and placed under a UN-administered transitional authority for ten years, renewable by plebiscite.
- No NATO troops.
- No Russian troops.
- No Ukrainian troops
- A joint Russo-Ukrainian constabulary under UN blue helmets with rotating command every six months. If the UN cannot handle the mission, then a joint force should be established.
2. **Demographic Guarantors**:
- **Crimean Autonomy Act** guaranteeing Russian language rights *and* minority representation at the regional parliament.
- **Donbas Charter** allowing each oblast the right to elect bilingual schools and municipal courts.
-**Elections within 10 years establish a popular government that ensures minority protections.
3. **Security Belt Map**:
- A 30-km demilitarized corridor around the current front line, monitored by OSCE(The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) drones and satellite transparency.
- A Joint Russo-Ukrainian “Marchland Security Council” chaired alternately by Moscow and Kyiv, with veto power restricted to *troop deployments*, not economic policy.
4. **Economic Stimulus & Reconstruction Fund**:
- $50 billion over five years, financed one-third by EU recovery funds, one-third by Russian hydrocarbon revenues (via a Crimea pipeline transit fee), and one-third by IMF reconstruction bonds.
- Priority projects: rail reconstruction from Mariupol to Rostov and LNG terminals at Feodosiya. Rare earth mining could be included as part of US involvement to help ensure peace and prosperity.
V. Why All Sides Might Accept
- **Russia**: Achieves permanent de-NATO-ization of the buffer without losing the Russian-speaking populations it claims to protect.
- **Ukraine**: Retains international recognition of sovereignty; regains trade corridors and reconstruction capital.
- **NATO/US**: Ends an open-ended proxy war that bleeds treasury and reputation.
- **Local Populations**: Escape the cycle of conscription, bombardment, and forced migration.
VI. Historical Closure
The Bridge to Peace, image by Douglas Ross
The Pontic steppe taught empires one consistent lesson: buffer zones are either polities in their own right or graveyards in the making. Catherine the Great’s colonization lasted 241 years; the Soviet era lasted 69. Both failed to extinguish the marchland character of this region. A modern, demilitarized, multinational buffer is not surrender; it is the only path proper to the land’s thousand-mile memory. The question is not whether Ukraine and Russia can coexist—they have always done so. The question is whether the great powers will allow the buffer to remain what it has always been: not a prize, but a bridge.
